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Response
Michael J. Shapiro

I. The Sivanian Gaze
Emmanuel Sivan’s essay assembles two dominant visions. The
first is the vision he ascribes to the Other. His historical gloss on
pan-Arab nationalism treats the various individuals and Middle
Eastern venues — e.g., Egypt/Nasser, Syria/Assad, and Iraq/
Hussein — from which pan-Arabism germinated. The second
vision is his own; it is a geo-strategic vision dominated by a
geopolitical or nation-state cartography. Whereas pan-Arabism,
whose ambitions he scorns and whose failures he celebrates,
sought to attenuate and denaturalize the national boundaries of
the Middle East, Dr. Sivan’s ambition is nationalist and his
vision is decidedly state-centric. He seeks to naturalize the
boundaries that pan-Arab movements have sought to challenge.
Moreover, his vision is directly wholly outward. “Arabs” exist
in the world around Israel; there is no reflection of the Arabness
within, in the space within which he writes.
Before treating the class of imaginaries that is at the center of
the world from which Dr. Sivan’s writing emerges, I want to
address the conceptual and methodological strategies that constitute the vehicles of his analysis. Most central to his argument
is the concept of myth. The failures of pan-Arabism have been
fatal to various myths, according to Dr. Sivan. His treatment of
the withering of the first myth, that of an Arab Piedmont,
inspired by the nineteenth-century European models, e.g., Prussia, is his most compelling analysis. As he points out, perhaps a
bit hyperbolically, “those ludicrous fragments of Arab political
entities”1 could not be easily aggregated into an effective political and military force. His ultimate reason for the failure of
assemblage is the relative privileging of national as opposed to
pan-Arab imaginaries within various Arab countries.
The second myth he claims to have fallen victim to events is
that of the artificiality of borders, an argument he ascribes to
pan-Arabists historically and most recently to Saddam Hussein.
Although I am no apologist for Saddam Hussein and his version
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of realpolitik, and I rarely find myself harkening to his words, I
am in agreement with Hussein about the origin of the system of
Middle Eastern sovereignties. British imperialism and the Red
Line Agreement of the major oil companies constructed the
boundaries of such entities as Kuwait. And Dr. Sivan also agrees
with Hussein, but, pointing to the failure of the local Kuwaiti
population to collaborate with Hussein, Dr. Sivan suggests that
such inaction makes the boundaries nonartificial. His inference
is that civil disobedience in response to the invasion is evidence
that what was once artificial is now a coherent form of civil society that supports the legitimacy of Kuwaiti sovereignty. Further,
he urges, the fact of civil wars along a border invented by the
British through the formerly united Yemen is also evidence that
what was once artificial is now compellingly legitimate.
Finally — and this is the most interesting part of Dr. Sivan’s
inquiry — he points to official texts in various Middle Eastern
countries; for example, postage stamps that have increasingly
manifested national themes. This constitutes further evidence of
a strong national commitment, he thinks. If this is correct, then
perhaps American nationalism is on the wane now that our
stamps show Elvis, Marilyn, and various jazz musicians, among
other cultural icons. In short, Dr. Sivan’s case for the primacy of
a national imaginary is not convincing, but it needn’t be. It
should suffice to note that the geopolitical map certainly
achieves respect from time to time, particularly at times when
people’s lives are threatened and national recognition is the
basis for both a domestic military initiative and international
assistance. What I want to suggest is that an appreciation of felt
affiliations requires a recognition of Middle Eastern maps other
than geopolitical ones. All national boundaries are indeed “artificial”; they arose from human boundary practices. It was not
the case that the world was already marked prior to the work of
aggregation and separation that produced the system of sovereignties. The closest model to a nonartificial set of markings are
what aboriginals call songlines. And although aboriginals cleave
strongly to the cosmogeny that produced those lines and derive
much of their responsibilities to each other as well as to
strangers from what they regard as a natural and spiritual cartography, they allow compassion and respect for alterity to be
deployed on other maps as well. Boundaries for them are not
100
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places to assert proprietary interests; they are “places of negotiation.”2
It is also the case that there are alternative maps of the Middle
East. The postcolonial, state-centric cartography is what Joseph
Conrad called “geography militant” (or, what I have called elsewhere, a “violent cartography”).3 When I saw Dr. Sivan’s original title, “Contending Views of the Middle East,” I hoped to see
what was advertised. What is offered in the essay might be best
titled “contentious” views. Nevertheless, there is an opening in
Dr. Sivan’s concept of “common interests.” He suggests that the
last “myth” to succumb to events is the myth of pan-Arab “common interests.” Here again, he is correct that reasons of state
have usually trumped a common Arabist imaginary at the level
of state policy. Why should one be surprised? Does this mean
that all feelings of commonality are extinguished? To answer
such a question, one has to resist the geopolitical imaginary that
constructs the outward trajectory of Dr. Sivan’s Middle Eastern
gaze. There are a variety of Middle Easts that one can disclose if
one avoids this dominant cartographic imaginary. But to do so,
one must resist a facile connection that Dr. Sivan establishes
with the simple use of a hyphen, i.e., his many references to the
“nation-state” in the second part of his analysis, where he seeks
to establish the “centrality of the nation-state in collective consciousness.” The hyphen between the two entities is a myth to
which states subscribe. They perform much of their legitimacy
by telling stories designed to suggest a historically coherent and
unified proto-national culture from which the state emerges. To
provide a vision that contends with that constitutive of the Sivanian gaze, I want to begin with some remarks on state stories in
general and then treat some that bear more specifically on “the
Middle East.”
II. State Stories
It is commonplace in the more critical genres of social theory to
locate much of the basis for a nation-state’s coherence in its identity stories. In these approaches, a nation’s unity-promoting
articulations are treated not simply as ideological representations, oriented toward supporting a particular apparatus of state
power. Nor are they treated, at the other end of the sovereignty
101
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code, as manifestations of the people’s will. Instead, they are
conceived in more critical terms that register interpretive contentions between the legitimations of mainstream national culture and what Homi Bhabha refers to as “those easily obscured,
but highly significant recesses of the national culture from
which alternative constituencies of peoples and oppositional
analytic capacities may emerge.”4 Given the complex sets of
forces that have been responsible for both assembling as a “people” those groupings identified as “nations” and the ambiguities
and contentiousness associated with the ways that such assemblages claim territories, their primary national stories must carry
a lot of weight. Indeed, there is nothing other than commitments
to stories for a national people to give themselves a historical
trajectory. As Etienne Balibar has noted, “No nation, that is no
national state, has an ethnic basis . . . but they do have to institute
in real (and therefore in historical) time their imaginary unity
against other possible unities.”5
Certainly, there are other modes of temporality and space that
supply evidence of a plurality that contests the imposed unity of
national stories. Exemplary of this challenge to national unity
stories is an episode recounted by the Mexican writer Carlos
Fuentes. Lost while driving with friends in the state of Morelos,
Mexico, Fuentes stopped in a village and asked an old peasant
the name of the village. “‘Well, that depends,’ answered the
peasant. ‘We call the village Santa María in times of peace. We
call it Zapata in times of war.’ ”6 Fuentes follows with a meditation that reveals the historical depth of forms of resistance to a
homogeneous national story and culture. He identifies an aspect
of centrifugal otherness that has existed relatively unrecognized
within modernity’s system of state sovereignties. Claiming that
the peasant has existed within a narrative trace that tends to be
uncoded in the contemporary institutionalized discourses on
space, he notes,
That old campesino knew what most people in the West have
assiduously ignored since the seventeenth century: that there is
more than one time in the world, that there is another time existing alongside, above, underneath the linear time calendars of the
West. This man who could live in the time of Zapata or the time
of Santa María, depending, was a living heir to a complex culture
of many strata in creative tension.7
102

04/15/97 3:04 PM

0906sha3.qxd

Michael J. Shapiro

By encountering an alterity that is at once inside and wholly
outside of the particular narrative within which his social and
cultural self-construction has been elaborated, Fuentes is able to
step back from the story of modernity that is continually recycled within nation-state-oriented discourses on time and space:
“What we call ‘modernity’ is more often than not this process
whereby the rising industrial and mercantile classes of Europe
gave unto themselves the role of universal protagonists of history.”8
Face-to-face with an otherness that these “protagonists” —
those who have managed to perform the dominant structures of
meaning — have suppressed, Fuentes is able to recover the historical trace of that otherness, and, on reflection, to recognize
that the encounter must yield more than mere affirmation for
the models of subjectivity, time, and space that affirm the coherence of a national people. Most significant, the encounter produces a disruption of the totalizing conceptions that have
governed contemporary state societies — for example, the illusions that they are unproblematically consolidated and that they
have quelled recalcitrant subjectivities.
Fuentes’s anecdote has no place in the literatures that constitute American political science in general or the study of “international relations” in particular. Unlike those literatures, which
tend to recycle the unity story, Fuentes’s account is a disruptive
one. The repression of such stories in literatures that promote
the myths of national unity constitute a strategy of containment,
an avoidance of disruptive contention. Indeed, the strength of
the system of national sovereignties lies in part in its control
over representations, just as the anxieties it seeks to allay arise
from suspicions that competitors to official stories, unless contained and marginalized, can produce significant disruption
within the mainstream national culture.
In short, the continuous process of affiliation, necessary to
reproduce a coherent national imaginary, produces symbolic
relays between nationhood and personhood. And primary
among these relays is the myth that the nation arises naturally
from the character of its people. The maintenance of such myths
requires significant control over discourse in general and over
the dominant story of national origin in particular, for many
identity claims, expressed within national societies, do not aid
103
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and abet the coherence project of the state; often, they “are
claims against the modern governmentality altogether,” as
Cindy Patton notes in her reading of the tension between official
and social discourses.9
The contestation of the “modern governmentality” requires
an ancient beginning. In Genesis 17:8, it is reported that Jehovah
said, “And I will give unto thee, to thy seed after thee, the land
wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession.” This divine land grant, the biblical promise
by Jehovah to Abraham, has had a variety of consequences for
Jewish-Other relations throughout history, but most significant
for present purposes, it resulted in a paradox in the midst of the
primary identity story of the Jewish people. This paradox is at
the center of an Old Testament reading by Edmund Leach, an
elaborate exercise of Lévi-Strauss’s method of structural interpretation.10 Leach’s treatment of the implications of the story of
the Jews for their national destiny, which springs from Jehovah’s alleged promise, focuses on “a patterning of arguments
about endogamy and exogamy.”11 He begins with a contradiction that has plagued Jewish history “from the earliest times
right down to the present day”:
On the one hand the practice of sectarian endogamy is essential
to maintain the purity of the faith, on the other hand exogamous
marriages may be politically expedient if peaceful relations are to
be maintained with hostile neighbors.12

This tension is revealed in the biblical texts, which “consistently affirm the righteousness of endogamy and the sinfulness
of exogamy,”13 but nevertheless have those in the main
genealogical line, from Judah onward, taking foreign wives.
Because of the political pressure on the texts to conform to “the
doctrine of the unique legitimacy of the royal house of Judah
and the unitary ascendancy of Solomon and Jerusalem,”14 the
marriages are treated as within-tribe, legitimate ones. For example, although both Tamar and Ruth are not Israelites, and
although their couplings with members of the Israelite lineage
(Judah and Boaz, respectively) are the seductions of women
treated in the text as harlots (the former explicitly and the latter
implicitly), the descendants are treated as pure-blooded.
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What emerges from Leach’s reading is a treatise on land and
politics. The Old Testament is cast as a story that has been
arranged both to legitimate Jewish title to the “land of Canaan”
and to affirm the historical coherence of the Jewish people. By
paying close attention to the paradoxes brought about by the
contradictions between the rules of endogamy and exogamy,
Leach shows the way the text has turned the arbitrary into the
coherent and unitary. What constitutes Jewish identity through
the centuries is commitment to a continuous genealogical and
spatial story.
This, of course, does not distinguish the Jewish collective
identity from many others; collective identities are almost
always a combination of narrative depth and spatial extension.
A “people” maintains and reproduces its unity and coherence
by continually performing its identity, by telling and retelling a
story that legitimates its model of who is inside and who is outside. But ironically, the drive toward exclusivity draws a people
ever closer to its Other(s), to those who serve to help the “people” recognize itself as a separate whole.
Indeed, the contemporary Israeli is haunted by the Arab
Other. For this reason, to the trope of mythology to which Dr.
Sivan has recourse, I want to juxtapose what Jacques Derrida
calls “hauntology.”15 Jewishness is haunted by Arabness because
the “Arab,” who is abjected outside as a threat to the Jewish people and to the state of Israel, is always already inside, haunting
the story some want to tell to perform the ethnic exclusivity of
the people and state. The aporias that Leach disclosed in the Old
Testament, which begin with the mythic land grant from Jehovah to Abraham, reassert themselves in the legal history that the
book enacts as well.
In various ways, the story of “the Jewish people” is more a
story of cultural amalgamation than one of ethnic and cultural
exclusivity. While the biblical story is more or less a story of
“how one man, through the generations, gradually becomes a
whole nation,”16 it is clear that such patriarchal stories are legends belied by the findings of ethnohistory.17 In the light of the
latter, it has been shown that the ancient Israelites coalesced in
various ways—economically, legally, and linguistically, in addition to intermarriage — with Canaanite tribes. Most basically,
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under the influence of Canaanite practices, they changed from
nomadic herders to fixed dwelling-agriculturalists.18
Canaanites and other resident-aliens in the Israelite territory
remained ambivalently understood neighbors; they were objects
of both moral solicitude, in the form of injunctions of tolerance
and special protections, and cultural dangers.19 Some of
Deuteronomy (as well as Exodus, Judges, and the Book of the
Covenant) is devoted to the need to protect the alien from
oppression,20 while some of Deuteronomy is also devoted to
demands from priestly authorities to “liberate Israel from
Canaanite customs” and “to protect the Israelite community
against Canaanite influence.”21 Interestingly, however, the legal
structures invoked to protect the purity of the Israelitic culture
were markedly Canaanite in origin.
One could refer to the irony of using Canaanite legalities,
assimilated into the Israelite codes, to distance the Israelite cult
from Canaanisms, but the more appropriate conceptual trope is
deconstructive. Put simply, the norms with which the ancient
Israelites sought to expel otherness from its cultural midst relied
precisely on the culture of that otherness.22 During the cultural
encounter, the more or less tent-dwelling, herding, tribal society
of the Israelites mingled with a city-dwelling, monarchical
group of Canaanites, and city practices ultimately dominated
the resulting legal infrastructure of Israelite codes; Deuteronomy is primarily a reflection of municipal law.23 References, for
example, to the authority of “the Elders at the gate” had supplanted the authority of clan patriarchs. “We can only conclude,” Johannes Pedersen noted, “that the Laws of
Deuteronomy and the Book of the Covenant are almost thoroughly Canaanite.”24
Nevertheless, a parallel priestly tradition shadowed the
process of acculturation, reacting against Canaanite influence
and exerting continual pressure to separate as much as possible
the Israelitic cult from Canaanism. The ancient Israelites had not
only developed a significant Canaanite psyche25 but had also
taken over many of the Canaanite spiritual practices, ranging
from the conceptual — ideas of “man” and nature — to the ritual
— the infusion of sexual and drinking rites into worship practices.26
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It was precisely the Israelitic practicing of Canaanite rituals
that animated the prophetic tradition. Jeremiah in particular had
harsh words about the sexual, drinking cults of the Baal worshipers, those whom, he claimed, have “assembled themselves
by troops in harlots’ houses.”27 But most significant, the
prophetic tradition reflects the struggle of elements within the
Israelitic cult to protect not simply particular modes of spirituality but rather the ethnic and political boundaries of the people.
On the one hand, there was the crisis created by exogenous
powers: “The prophets could not have emerged,” Max Weber
argued, “except for the world politics of the great powers,”28
namely the threat of conquest by Egyptians, Assyrians, and
Babylonians. On the other hand, the foreign threat was heightened, according to the prophets, by the anger of Yahweh in reaction to the assimilative practices of the Israelites. Then, as now
(in contemporary state societies), there was an entanglement
between the map of external danger and domestic interethnic
antagonisms. Domestically, the prophets’ laments were, in
Weber’s terms, “gratuitous.”29 Unlike Egyptian and Hellenic
prophets, who were, in effect, house oracles, the Hebrew
prophets were independent alarmists. Their preachments of
doom reflected not only a heightened and anachronistic mode of
piety but also spatial history.
For the prophets “the desert times remained . . . the truly pious
epoch.”30 They lamented the demise of a desert existence, for in
the encounter between attacking desert clans and city-dwelling
residents, the resulting assimilation produced a cultural hybridity that favored the city life and monarchical structures of the
Canaanites. Under the influence of city life, many Israelites
absorbed Canaanite spiritual practices. The Canaanite remained
an alien within the Israelite governance in both pre- and postmonarchical Israel, but the Israelites became significantly
Canaanized.
In addition, language provides no stable basis for separating
Jew and Arab. While ethnohistorical work on ancient Israel
shows that it is problematic to speak of Jews as a people, the
issue becomes more complex when the trajectory of that “people” is followed through the Diaspora. For example, while the
installation of Hebrew as a national language of Israel functions
as a symbol of common cultural heritage, Hebrew has not been a
107
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historical mechanism of cultural distinction for a “Jewish people” as a whole. During the process of acculturation in ancient
Israel, the Israelites’ vernacular language became Aramaic. The
linguistic evidence pertaining to ancient Israel/Palestine suggests that “Jews, like almost all other national and tribal groups
in the Levant and Mesopotamia, generally came to adopt Aramaic as their normal means of communication.”31 Hebrew
remained an important symbol of Jewish distinctiveness — by
the third century B.C.E., it was used on coins, and the curatorial
class associated with the temple and Torah used it to distinguish
themselves from the rest of the population—but throughout the
Diaspora, a temple-based, curatorial tradition was not strong. 32
Significantly, the ancient Israelites did not consider a shared
language an important way of distinguishing themselves from
their neighbors, even though they often thought of themselves
as a distinct nation. The speaking of Hebrew was not, in sum, an
essential element of ancient Jewish identity; it was then, as later
during the Diaspora, more of a “social marker used to distinguish the protectors of the Torah from other classes.”33 Moreover, even that which was protected, the language of the Torah,
has not been based on a wholly separate or purely Hebrew language. The Old Testament has evolved on the basis of what
Hebrew shares with other Semitic languages. Throughout the
history of the Old Testament, emendations have resulted from
philological work in which the meanings of Hebrew words and
phrases have been changed by examining the terms and expressions in cognate Semitic languages (as well as others): Aramaic,
classical Syriac, Akkadian, Ugaritic, and classical Arabic.34
Ironically, Arabs were not only already there in the supposed
“land without people” of the Zionist imaginary but have been
always already there in the supposed language of Jewish distinction, Hebrew. For example, one resolution of a disputed passage in the Book of Judges, which had long been considered
difficult and ambiguous, was achieved with attention to a relevant Arabic verb.35
This historical imbrication between Jew and Arab has significance for an alternative — “contending” — vision of the Middle
East. First, I want to suggest a general one in which “common
interest” can be supported by a story other than the exclusive
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nationalist one favored in the cartographic imaginary constructing Dr. Sivan’s account.
Ammiel Alcalay has recently made a concerted effort to disrupt the dominant identity story of the state of Israel.36 He has
explored the historical depth of the Arab-Jewish cultural imbrication, the persistence of Levantine culture, which militates
against the official Israeli policy of a Jewish state and an end to
the Diaspora, and the desire to locate the Arab outside the
boundaries of the Israeli polity. Alcalay treats both the wellknown divisions in Israeli society between European and “Oriental” Jews and, more important, the affinity of the “Oriental”
Jew to Arab culture. The reconstruction of ancient Hebrew as a
modern national language in Israel has constituted a meaning
system aimed at, among other things, expunging the Levantine
— shared Arab-Jewish — cultural system that had developed
since the period of Islamic domination of Spain and the Middle
East, a period during which Jewish culture developed within an
Islamic context.
Alcalay shows how Hebrew, along with other systems of representation, has imposed an order of truth of identity congenial
to a project of national unification, Jewish exclusiveness, and
Euro-Jewish (Ashkenazi) dominance. It is a project of national
coherence that requires the Arab as an absolute other. But this
symbolic boundary drawing, which has accompanied policies of
actual spatial partition and has been supported by complicit discourses within official, popular, and academic venues, must
confront strong evidence of Arabness within. The Oriental Jew
retains strong connections with Arab culture. It is not unusual,
for example, for an Israeli Jew from Iraq to recognize herself or
himself better in Palestinian poetry than in the contemporary
Hebrew novel.37
The dominant cultural unity story of the state of Israel
represses such recalcitrant elements of unfinished national
assimilation, but the ethnohistorical evidence indicates that
there was never a unity except by dint of a unifying mythology
that repressed and smoothed over elements of difference. The
repression of hybridity, which constituted the ancient Israelite
as a historical character, remains an element in the stories
through which official Israeli discourse strives to reconstitute
the Israeli Jew as a unique and unalloyed national character.
109
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It is clear nevertheless that the problem of Arab otherness is
accompanied by a problem of Jewish otherness in the state of
Israel: there is more than one Jewish character. One of the dominant characters emerges from what might best be termed the
frontier story of nation-building in contemporary Israel. Controversial but still significant in contemporary Israel is what is popularly known as the “Tower and Stockade” story.38 Constructed
in part to counter the traditional story of the passivity of the
exilic Jew, it “serves as a culturally compelling ‘foundation
myth,’ ” valorizing heroic acts of settlement in defiance of “the
antagonistic policy of the British mandate and armed attacks of
Arab gangs.”39
Although there is significant resistance to the story as a narrative of Israeli identity, it serves to energize the continuing settlement process into disputed territories, a process reflecting the
extent to which “Israel” has been a continuously frontier society.
Moreover, it allocates a privileged social and political identity to
original settlers, who are primarily European in background,
while deprivileging more recent immigrants: Holocaust survivors and other recent political refugees from both the former
Soviet Union and Arab countries. Given the dominant, Euro-oriented story of Israel’s nation-building, the more recent influx of
immigrants is read as a cultural threat, augmenting the number
of perpetual strangers in the land. “Oriental” Jews, for example,
take on the alien status of the domestic Arabs.
Finally, if we construct a Middle East that consists of the
mythologies of Israeli nationalism and the aspirations of geopolitical rivals such as Gamal Abdel Nasser and Saddam Hussein,
we cannot detect the more compassionate and contending Middle Eastern voices that abhor the nationalist proclamations and
militance on various sides of geopolitical boundaries. There is
insufficient space here to review the cacophony of alternatives
(e.g., I would like to devote time to the writings of the Palestinian Christian Jabar Ibrahim Jabar, among others), but I will close
with two examples.
First I want to call attention to a film by the Israeli director
Rafi Bukai. In contrast to triumphalist sentiments in Israel
emerging from the 1967 war, Bukai’s Avanti Populi offers a “contending vision.” Unlike the more nationalistic films, it makes
use of Israeli Palestinians as actors (playing the role of Egyptians
110
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during the 1967 Six-Day War), and it sidesteps the Israeli-Arab
dichotomy, foregrounding instead those with peace-seeking
versus warmongering positions. Most significant, it dissolves
the estrangement between Israeli and Egyptian soldiers, particularly in a moment when an Egyptian soldier adopts a Jewish
persona and recites a Shylock speech from The Merchant of
Venice.40
Second, I want to call attention to the writings of Arab women
who have offered contending constructions of nationhood in the
Middle East. As Miriam Cooke has noted,
Women’s literary constructions of the nation in the 1980s in
Lebanon emerged in response to a sense that not only had those
nationalist/ideological projects failed, but that they were responsible for the carnage of the civil war. Such constructions challenge the generally accepted use of “nationalism” to denote
advocacy of the principle that a state should conform to the
wishes and beliefs of the majority, however that majority may be
defined. This kind of nationalism may be called “statist” because
of its insistence on the overlap between an imagined community,
the nation, and a public entity, the state.41

Among the challenges to which Cooke refers is Huda
Barakat’s novel The Laughing Stone, in which Barakat examines
“the ways in which nationalism drives men to reject their blood
kin so as to create new families out of a military matrix.”42 One
could also point to the brilliant novel Beirut Blues by Hanan alShaykh, in which it becomes evident that many Lebanese have
ambivalent, diasporic rather than nationalist mentalities. And,
more significant, it maps the destructiveness of state-oriented
violent cartographies on the lives of peoples divided by such
geopolitics. Poignantly, after being given a ride in a tank during
the Lebanese war, her character describes the world-view of
those who ride in it — which is not unlike the monocularity of
the geopolitical gaze:
Now I understand why when they are in a tank soldiers feel they
can crush cars and trees in their path like brambles, because
they’re disconnected from everything, their own souls and bodies included, and what’s left is this instrument of steel rolling
majestically forward. I feel as if I’ve entered another world. No
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destruction. No streets, no people, no long years of war; they’re
gone, as if I have been in a submarine the whole time. There is no
window where we are, and the feeble light comes from a bulb, or
filters through from the small windows in the driver’s area.43

Finally, this analysis of “contending visions” cannot ignore
the fighting going on (as I write) between “Jews” and “Arabs” as
a result of contention over sacred places in the city of Jerusalem.
I want to note that while it may be the case that the myth of an
effective, militant pan-Arabism was dealt an almost fatal blow
during the 1967 war, as Dr. Sivan notes, another near fatality has
been a flourishing, multicultural Jerusalem.
As Alcalay notes, “[A]s the Arab character of the city is continually being eroded, strangling its links to the Levant,
Jerusalem encloses the space of yet another incoherence. A complete microcosm of the Levantine and Arab Jewry[,]...it remains
effectively cut off from significant access to the texture, substance and wider sphere of determinants that [compose] the
world it forms a part of.”44 The cityscape has changed from terraced olive groves and ruti trees to “massive residential and
institutional structures,” fortresslike dwellings and places
“overshadowing rural enclaves with the remaining ‘natives.’ ”45
After the reunification of the city in 1967, Jerusalem was isolated from its old and habitual world. “The percentage of people
knowing only victory or defeat — those born into either side of
the occupation — has steadily muffled even the possibility of
hearing voices that could articulate the knowledge of a different
experience.”46 Let me offer a brief fragment from one recently
unmuffled voice, that of an Algerian woman, whose words have
resonance for domains of contention well beyond the Middle
East that emerges in Dr. Sivan’s essay. Assia Djebar speaks of
the emerging voices of women who “revolt in Arabic,” with liberatory effects for Arab women, who have been incarcerated
within the social, religious, and geopolitical militance of the men
who create the Radical Islam with which Dr. Sivan is preoccupied. Now, she says,
A new, fresh discursive field is imperceptibly traced for other
Arab women. A point of take-off. A combat zone. A restoration of
body. Bodies of new women in spite of new barriers, which in the
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internal, interior language at once retracted and proclaimed, public and no longer secret find roots before rushing forth. . . . A loud
voice that gives body. Body and new forms restoring a darker,
deeper texture to hear louder voices.47

Notes
1. Emmanuel Sivan, “Contending Arab Visions” in Macalester International 4
(Spring 1997): 59.
2. For a discussion of songlines, see Bruce Chatwin, The Songlines (New York:
Viking, 1987). The treatment of boundaries as places of negotiation for aboriginals is mentioned in Paul Carter, The Road to Cotany Bay (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1991).
3. See Joseph Conrad, “Geography and Some Explorers,” in his Last Essays
(New York: Doubleday, Page, 1926), 6; and Michael J. Shapiro, Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1997).
4. Homi K. Bhabha, Introduction to Nation and Narration, ed. Homi K. Bhabha
(New York: Routledge, 1990), 3.
5. Etienne Balibar, “Racism and Nationalism,” in Etienne Balibar and
Emmanuel Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, trans. Chris
Turner (New York: Verso, 1991), 49.
6. Carlos Fuentes, “Writing in Time” in Democracy 2 (1982): 61.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., 64.
9. Cindy Patton, “Tremble, Hetero Swine!” in Fear of a Queer Planet, ed. Michael
Warner (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 163.
10. Edmund Leach, “The Legitimacy of Solomon,” in Structuralism: A Reader,
ed. Michael Lane (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), 248–92.
11. Ibid., 248.
12. Ibid., 257.
13. Ibid., 258.
14. Ibid., 266.
15. See Jaques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge,
1994).
16. Johannes Pedersen, Israel: Its Life and Culture, vol. 1 (London: Oxford University Press 1926), 12.
17. I am using the concept of ethnohistory to refer simply to “the use of . . . ethnological methods and materials“ to investigate historical cultural encounters. In
addition, I am juxtaposing ethnohistory, which treats the changes in cultures
and the process of acculturation, to mythological histories that impose fixed
cultural identities rather than registering the ambiguous boundaries between
various peoples as they co-invent cultural forms and practices. See James L.

113

04/15/97 3:04 PM

0906sha3.qxd

Macalester International

Vol. 4

Axtell, The European and the Indian: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North
America (New York: Oxford University Press 1981), 5.
18. Pedersen, Israel: Its Life and Culture, vol. 1, 21.
19. For a general description of the relationships, see Christiana van Houten,
The Alien in Israelite Law (Sheffield, England: JSOT Press, 1991).
20. Ibid., 67.
21. Pedersen, Israel: Its Life and Culture, vol. 1, 26.
22. The explicative literature on deconstruction is vast. Perhaps the best place
for a thorough rehearsal of the critical dimensions, with a strong application, is
in Jacques Derrida’s Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Spivak (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1976).
23. Pedersen, Israel: Its Life and Culture, vol. 1, 35.
24. Ibid., 28.
25. Pedersen, Israel: Its Life and Culture, vol. 4, 466.
26. Ibid., 471.
27. Jeremiah 5:7.
28. Max Weber, Ancient Judaism, trans. Hans Gerth (New York: The Free Press
1952), 268.
29. Ibid., 278.
30. Ibid., 285.
31. Seth Schwartz, “Language, Power, and Identity in Ancient Palestine” in
Past & Present, no. 148 (August 1995): 19.
32. Ibid., 4.
33. Ibid., 45.
34. James Barr, Comparative Philology and the Text of the Old Testament (Winona
Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 1987), 36.
35. Ibid., 15.
36. Ammiel Alcalay, After Jews and Arabs: Remaking Levantine Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
37. Ibid., 25.
38. Tamar Katriel and Aliza Shenhar, “Tower and Stockade: Dialogic Narration in Israeli Settlement Ethos” in The Quarterly Journal of Speech 76 (1990):
359 – 80.
39. Ibid., 361.
40. My reading of the film follows the analysis of Nurith Gertz, “A World
without Boundaries: Israeli National Identity in the Eighties as Expressed in
Cinema and Literature” in Discourse Social/Social Discourse 4 (1992): 155–70.
41. Miriam Cooke, “Reimagining Lebanon” in South Atlantic Quarterly 94, no. 4
(Fall 1995): 1078.
42. Ibid., 1082.
43. Hanan al-Shaykh, Beirut Blues, trans. Catherine Cobham (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 67.

114

04/15/97 3:04 PM

0906sha3.qxd

Michael J. Shapiro

44. Ammiel Alcalay, “The Geography of Time” in Michigan Quarterly Review
31, no. 4 (Fall 1992): 505.
45. Ibid., 507.
46. Ibid., 506.
47. Assia Djebar, Introduction to Nawal al-Saadawi’s “Ferdaous: A Voice from
Hell,” in Opening the Gates: A Century of Arab Feminist Writing, ed. Margot Badran and Miriam Cooke (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 387 – 88.

115

